

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ACCRA 06053 01 OF 03 271126Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 CIAE-00  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02  
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MCE-00 /096 W

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R 270847Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4780  
INFO SECDEFENSE WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC //J-5//  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4/7-SA//

S E C R E T NOFORN SECTION 1 OF 3 ACCRA 6053

NOFORN

DEPT PASS ACDA AND USAID

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2 DECLASS 12-31-2008  
TAGS: MASS MPOL XX GH  
SUBJ: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

REF: (A) STATE 167901 (B) STATE 185943

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1. THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PROVIDES ONE OF BEST  
WAYS OF ESTABLISHING AND DEVELOPING CONTACT WITH GHANAIA  
MILITARY, GROUP WHICH HAS BEEN IN POWER SINCE 1972 AND WILL  
CONTINUE TO PLAY IMPORTANT, POSSIBLY DECISIVE, DIRECT OR  
INDIRECT ROLE IN GHANAIA POLITICAL. INFLUENCE OF US  
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY TRAINING ON MORE THAN 300 MID-LEVEL  
AND SENIOR OFFICERS OF GHANA ARMED FORCES BOTH ACTIVE AND  
RETIRED HAS BEEN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TOWARD GHANA'S  
WESTERN ORIENTATION. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ACCRA 06053 01 OF 03 271126Z

VIRTUALLY ALL IMET AND ESSENTIALLY GRANT AID ALTHOUGH  
REQUESTS FOR MORE TANGIBLE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MAY BE  
FORTHCOMING UNDER NEW GOG. ALL TRAINING IS CONDUCTED IN  
CONUS AND THUS PROVIDES MAXIMUM EXPOSURE OF GHANAIA  
TO US INFLUENCE. OUR INTERESTS IN MAINTAINING AND INFLUENCING  
CONTACTS WITHIN GHANAIA MILITARY ARE WELL SERVED BY SECURITY  
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM SEEKS TO MODERNIZE AND STANDARDIZE THE GHANA ARMED FORCES. OBJECTIVES ARE TO RAISE THE EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING STANDARDS OF ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL, DEVELOP ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE, TRAINING, MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT BASE AND IMPROVE COMMAND AND CONTROL.

2. THE GOG PERCEIVES EXTERNAL THREAT BASED IN TOGO. IRREDENTIST ELEMENTS OF THE EWE TRIBE ARE BELIEVED BY GOG TO BE PLOTTING, WITH CONNIVANCE OF GOVERNMENT OF TOGO, TO DETACH GHANA'S VOLTA REGION AND JOIN IN WITH TOGO. NO SPECIFIC STRATEGY, HOWEVER IS APPARENT TO MEET THIS PERCEIVED THREAT. THE NEAREST TROOPS TO THE TOGO BORDER ARE ASSIGNED TO GHANA'S ONE MORTAR REGIMENT WHICH IS A UNIT NOT EQUAL IN STRENGTH TO A US BATTALION. GOG ADMITS OF NO INTERNAL THREAT, BUT DISPOSITIONS OF ARMED FORCES ARE CALCULATED TO COUNTER SUCH A THREAT. ALL COMBAT TROOP INSTALLATIONS ARE LOCATED (ON MAIN ROADS) ADJACENT TO ALL MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS.

3. THE MISSION DISCOUNTS ANY EXTERNAL THREAT FROM GHANA'S NEIGHBORS. ADJACENT COUNTRIES ACTING SINGLY OR IN CONCERT WOULD NOT BE A MATCH FOR THE GHANA ARMED FORCES. THE MILITARY APPEARS TO BE FIRMLY ENTRENCHED AND ANY INTERNAL THREAT WOULD LIKELY COME FROM WITHIN THE MILITARY ITSELF AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE MILITARY COUP OF JULY 5, 1978 THAT  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ACCRA 06053 01 OF 03 271126Z

BROUGHT LT. GENERAL AKUFFO TO POWER.

4. THE GOG APPEARS TO CONSIDER PRESENT ARMED FORCES ORGANIZATION ADEQUATE. SOME MODEST INCREASES IN STRENGTH FOR THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE HAVE BEEN MADE DUE TO RECENT ACQUISITION OF FOUR NEW PATROL CRAFT AND SIX NEW AIRCRAFT. GHANA ARMED FORCES TOTAL ABOUT 16,000 OFFICERS AND MEN ORGANIZED AS FOLLOWS:

ARMY: (12,500) TWO BRIGADES, SIX INFANTRY BATTALIONS WITH NOMINAL COMBAT AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS.

NAVY: (1,200) TWO SMALL SHORE BASES, NINE CRAFT OF WHICH THE LARGEST ARE TWO SUB CHASERS.

AIR FORCE: (1,500) FORTY AIRCRAFT INCLUDE HELICOPTERS, SIX FOKKER F-27 AIRCRAFT, ONE FOKKER F-28 AIRCRAFT AND TWELVE AER-MACCHI JET TRAINER/FIGHTERS. THERE IS BORDER GUARD FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 4,000 OFFICERS AND MEN ALSO A PART OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

5. THE GHANA ARMED FORCES ARE CONSIDERED ADEQUATE TO PERFORM THEIR MISSION. WHAT IS NEEDED IS REFINEMENT THROUGH MODERNIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS, UPGRADING OF TRAINING AND STANDARDIZATION OF

EQUIPMENT. GHANA DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON OVERSEAS PROCUREMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. PRICE SHOPPING HAS RESULTED IN A POLYGLOT INVENTORY OF VEHICLES, WEAPONS AND AIRCRAFT. SOONER OR LATER GHANA WILL LIKELY SEEK A SINGLE SOURCE SUPPLIER FOR HER NEEDS. IT IS IMPORTANT, IF THE TIME COMES, THAT SUPPLIER BE WESTERN.

6. DEFENSE BUDGET, 1978-79: CEDI 183,249,000. FOREIGN EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS: CEDI 60,512,000. (FOR 1978 IMPORT

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PAGE 01 ACCRA 06053 02 OF 03 271136Z  
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FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4/7-SA//

S E C R E T NOFORN SECTION 2 OF 3 ACCRA 6053

NOFORN

DEPT PASS ACDA AND USAID

LICENSE YEAR MOD HAS APPROVED OVERSEAS EXPENDITURES OF CEDI 72,000,000.) OVERALL MILITARY SPENDING HAS REMAINED AT A MODEST LEVEL. IN FY-77-78 THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE BUDGET WAS ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF TOTAL PLANNED GOG EXPENDITURES. THE LATEST GNP DATA FOR GHANA IS FOR 1974 AND DRASTIC INCREASES IN PRICES SINCE THEN AND A LACK OF DATA COMPLICATE ANY ESTIMATE OF THE GNP. THUS, COMPARISON OF MILITARY SPENDING WITH GNP IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE AT THIS TIME. PLANNED MILITARY IMPORTS FOR 1978 ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT 7 PERCENT OF TOTAL ESTIMATED IMPORTS. GHANA HAS A CONTINUING FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONSTRAINT AND ALL FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS ARE OFFICIALLY REGULATED. AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE ARE NO DEBT SERVICE PROBLEMS.

7. N/A

8. GOG HAS INDICATED INTEREST IN THE FOLLOWING MAJOR ITEMS  
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PAGE 02 ACCRA 06053 02 OF 03 271136Z

OF U.S. EQUIPMENT FOR FY-80. IF MADE, THESE PURCHASES WILL BE U.S. COMMERCIAL BUYS. TWO EACH C-130 AIRCRAFT (EST. COST: DOLLARS 23,000,000) TO PROVIDE NEEDED AIRLIFT CAPABILITY TO GHANA FORCES. OBSOLETE SKYVANS AND LIMITED LOAD F-27 AIRCRAFT DO NOT PROVIDE LIFT CAPABILITY REQUIRED BY ARMED FORCES IN NATION OF FEW AND POOR ROADS. SIXTEEN U.S. HELICOPTERS (EST. COST: DOLLARS 5,500,000). PRESENT HELICOPTER INVENTORY CONSISTS OF FOUR AIRCRAFT, TWO ARE FRENCH ALLOUETTE III CRAFT AND TWO ARE U.S. BELL 212. PURCHASE OF ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT IS COMPATIBLE WITH ONGOING MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND WILL PROVIDE MUCH NEEDED FLEXIBILITY DUE TO SHORTAGE OF FORWARD AREA AIRFIELDS AND POOR ROAD CONDITIONS.

9. THE TOTAL COST OF THE ITEMS IN (8) ABOVE IS DOLLARS 28.5 MILLION, INCLUDING INITIAL TRAINING, SPARES AND MAINTENANCE. THIS AMOUNT IS A TINY PROPORTION OF GHANA'S ESTIMATED IMPORT BILL OF AROUND DOLLARS 750 MILLION. BECAUSE OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONSTRAINT, POOR MANAGEMENT, AND DISORTIONS IN THE ECONOMY, SHORTAGES OF IMPORTED GOODS ARE USUAL. THE SCARCE FOREIGN EXCHANGE SPENT ON MILITARY AIRCRAFT COULD BE USED TO IMPORT RAW MATERIALS AND CAPITAL EQUIPMENT THAT COULD CREATE EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE AND BOOST EXPORTS, OR AT LEAST REDUCE IMPORTS OF CONSUMER GOODS AND FOOD.

10. GIVEN NEW GOG POLICY TO SEEK RAPPROCHEMENT WITH TOGO ON BORDER DISPUTE, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT MODEST ACQUISITIONS ENVISAGED WILL HAVE ANY IMPACT ON REGIONAL STABILITY. THE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT OF ANY PRESENT OR POTENTIAL REQUESTS FOR SALES ARE THEREFORE NEGLIGIBLE.

11. THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN GHANA OF JULY 5, 1978  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ACCRA 06053 02 OF 03 271136Z

AND THE SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS BY HEAD OF STATE, LIEUTENANT GENERAL AKUFFO HAVE HAD POSITIVE IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN GHANA. PRISONERS AND DETAINEES HELD SINCE REFERENDUM WERE RELEASED DAY AFTER THE PALACE COUP. A GENERAL AMNESTY WAS DECLARED FOR ALL IN SELF-IMPOSED EXILE ABROAD. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO MADE PUBLIC COMMITMENTS TO

THE RETURN TO "CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT" BY JULY 1979.  
AS PART OF THAT PLEDGE, SOME CORRUPT MILITARY LEADERS IN  
CIVILIAN POSITIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN REASSIGNED TO MILITARY  
JOBS OR RETIRED. THESE TWO ACTIONS MAKE A START IN REMOVING  
MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCKS TO IMPROVED U.S.-GHANAIAAN RELATIONS  
THAT HAVE PERSISTED FOR SOME TIME UNDER REGIME OF GENERAL  
ACHEAMPONG. THE NEW HEAD OF STATE HAS ALREADY SIGNALLED  
THAT HE WILL REQUEST ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE FROM U.S.

12. FY -80 FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS PROJECTED AT  
DOLLARS 600,000 THEN DROPPING TO DOLLARS 400,000 FOR THE FORE-  
SEEABLE FUTURE. ALL ASSISTANCE IS FOR TRAINING PURPOSES AND ALL  
IS FROM BRITISH COMMONWEALTH NATIONS. GHANA RECEIVES  
CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S., CANADA,  
THE U. K. AND THE FRG. OTHER WESTERN NATIONS SUCH AS THE  
NETHERLANDS, DENMARK, FRANCE AND AUSTRALIA HAVE MORE MODEST  
AID EFFORTS. EASTERN BLOCK COUNTRIES ALSO HAVE MODEST AID  
PROGRAMS, MOSTLY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. MULTILATERAL AGENCIES  
SUCH AS THE WORLD BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY  
AND THE UNDP ALSO HAVE EXTENSIVE AID PROGRAMS. THE ASSISTANCE  
COMMITMENTS OF THESE AND OTHER MULTILATERAL AGENCIES IN  
FY-1977 WERE DOLLARS 61.0 MILLION. USAID'S ASSISTANCE TO GHANA  
IN FY-77, INCLUDING LOANS AND GRANTS, WAS DOLLARS 5.1 MILLION.

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 ACCRA 06053 03 OF 03 271144Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 CIAE-00  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02  
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FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4782

INFO SECDEFENSE WASHDC

JCS WASHDC //J-5//

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S E C R E T NOFORN SECTION 3 OF 3 ACCRA 6053

NOFORN

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13 (A). LEVEL 1 PROGRAM (IMET ONLY). GRANT AID- DOLLARS 100,000.  
PROVIDE TRAINING OF 20 TO 25 OFFICERS IN SELECTED COURSES.  
DUE TO IMPORTANCE OF IMET TO GHANA ARMED FORCES, WERE TRAINING  
TO DROP BELOW 20 OFFICERS YEARLY, IT IS HIGHLY DOUBTFUL  
THAT US OBJECTIVES RELATED TO THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
COULD BE MET.

13 (B). LEVEL 2 PROGRAM (IMET ONLY). GRANT AID - DOLLARS  
175,000. THIS WOULD TRAIN AS ESTIMATED 25 TO 30 OFFICERS AND  
IS CONSIDERED MARGINAL TO MEET US OBJECTIVES.

13 (C) LEVEL 3 PROGRAM (IMET ONLY). GRANT AID - DLS 275,000.  
THIS LEVEL WOULD PROVIDE TRAINING FOR AN ESTIMATED 60 TO  
65 OFFICERS (BASED ON FY-78 PROGRAM) AND IS CONSIDERED  
OPTIMUM. THE IMET PROGRAM SHOULD LEVEL OFF AT 60 TO 65  
STUDENT LEVEL. BEYOND THAT THE GHANA ARMED FORCES HAS SOME  
DIFFICULTY IN PROVIDING QUALIFIED PERSONNEL.

13 (D). N/A  
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PAGE 02 ACCRA 06053 03 OF 03 271144Z

13 (E). SEE (A), (B), AND (C) ABOVE.

13 (F). USDAO, GHANA CONSISTS OF ONE DATT (06), ONE  
OPERATIONS COORDINATOR (W1), ONE INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST  
(E5) AND ONE PART TIME (20 HR/WK), CIVILIAN SECURITY  
ASSISTANCE CLERK-TYPIST (GS5). THIS IS MINIMUM MANNING  
POSSIBLE FOR PROGRAM LEVELS 1 AND 2. IT IS NOT ADEQUATE  
FOR PROGRAM LEVEL 3. AT THE LEAST CLERK-TYPIST POSITION  
SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED AS FULL TIME POSITION. ANY EXPANSION  
OF PROGRAM ABOVE LEVEL 3 WOULD REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AUGMENTA-  
TION BEYOND ONE FULL TIME CLERK TYPYST.

13 (G). N/A

13 (H). ALL TRAINING IS PROPOSED FOR IMET. ALL TRAINING  
IS SCHEDULED FOR CONUS. IMET IS THE PREMIER PROGRAM  
IN SUPPORT OF OUR INTERESTS IN GHANA (CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS  
CONTACT WITH THE GHANA MILITARY AND MAXIMUM EXPOSURE TO US  
METHODS, CHARACTERISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY). THE PROPOSED  
TRAINING IS NOT AVAILABLE FROM INDIGENOUS SOURCES. THIRD  
COUNTRY SOURCES WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO US INTERESTS,  
E.G., CLOSE AND CONTINUING US CONTACT WITH GHANA ARMED  
FORCES. FMS WOULD EXPOSE GHANA MILITARY PERSONNEL TO US  
ENVIRONMENT, IF GHANA COULD AFFORD AFFORD EXPENSE, BUT ON A SELLER/  
BUYER BASIS AS OPPOSED TO THE PRESENT FRIENDLY FELLOW PRO-  
FESSIONAL STATUS WE ENJOY.

US MILITARY TRAINING FOR GHANA CONCENTRATES ON THOSE COURSES  
WHICH HAVE UTILITY IN CIVILIAN AS WELL AS MILITARY SPHERES.

THE PROPOSED FY-79 PROGRAM, AS FOLLOWS, IS MODEL, REFLECTING  
BOTH TYPE OF TRAINING AND APPROXIMATE NUMBERS OF TO TRAINED,  
PROJECTED THROUGH FY-82.

SECRET

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PAGE 03 ACCRA 06053 03 OF 03 271144Z

#### I. MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURSES

A. COMMAND AND STAFF SCHOOLS	10
B. FINANCE MANAGEMENT	5
C. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT	2
D. LOG EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT	1

#### II. TECHNICAL COURSES

A. MEDICAL	6
B. ADPS	5
C. SIGNAL	5
D. MILITARY POLICE	3
E. TRANSPORTATION	3
F. PUBLIC AFFAIRS	3
G. ENGINEER	2
H. ORDNANCE	2
I. ADPS	2
J. JAG	1
K. CHAPLAIN	1
L. MECHANIC (HELO)	1
M. PARACHUTE RIGGER	1

#### III. MILITARY COURSES

A. INFANTRY	5
B. RANGER/AIRBORNE	3
C. INTELLIGENCE	2
D. PSYOPS	1
E. ARMOR	1

13 (I). WE PROPOSE ONLY IMET FOR GHANA, AND THAT UNDER  
GRANT AID. AS COVERED IN 13 (C) ABOVE, WE FEEL THAT  
CURRENT LEVEL (60 TO 65 STUDENTS ANNUALLY) IS OPTIMUM TO  
OUR BEST INTERESTS. WE SEE THIS CURRENT IMET LEVEL AS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 ACCRA 06053 03 OF 03 271144Z

CONTINUING REQUIREMENT IN FY-80 THROUGH FY-82.  
HOLMES

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## Message Attributes

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**SAS ID:** 1861013  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
**TAGS:** MASS, MPOL, XX, GH  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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